PEERING is an open testbed and welcomes experiments from researchers, educators, and network operators. To use the testbed, create an account and submit a proposal. In your proposal, please describe your experiment and its goals. In particular, describe:
The proposal review process allows PEERING staff to verify that experiments follow PEERING's Acceptable Use Policy and remain informed of ongoing experiments so that they can quickly respond to any operational problems or complaints. PEERING staff also provide feedback about experimental design, including possible problems and improvements.
After the approval of your proposal, you will receive certificates that will allow you to establish VPN tunnels to and BGP sessions with PEERING's servers. You can use any software for this, but the default PEERING client software may be a starting point. The project Wiki also contains additional details on PEERING that may be useful.
| Experiment Name | University / Organization | Approved at | Allocated prefixes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Locating DDoS Attackers | UFMG | 11/22/2016 11:26 p.m. | — |
| SBAS Secure Backbone Prototype | Princeton University | 06/30/2020 2:10 p.m. | 66.180.190.0/23 |
| Measurements of Path Dynamics and Communities | UFMS | 01/17/2020 3:04 p.m. | — |
| Validation of Traceroute-Inferred AS-Relationships | CAIDA, UC San Diego | 02/02/2021 2:06 p.m. | — |
| Detection of BGP interception attacks based on RTT changes | Princeton University | 01/25/2021 8:03 p.m. | 184.164.228.0/23 |
| IPv6 Route Flooding | TU Berlin / INET | 09/25/2021 5:57 p.m. | 2804:269c:10::/44 |
| Hybrid anycast and DNS-based redirection reliability study | Columbia University | 10/07/2020 1:53 a.m. | 184.164.244.0/22 |
| Controlling Ingress Paths | Columbia University | 11/08/2021 5:50 p.m. | 184.164.238.0/23, 184.164.240.0/22 |
| BGP security monitoring | 08/31/2022 5:58 p.m. | 199.36.157.0/24, 208.87.172.0/23, 2620:33:c000::/48 | |
| Smart BGP hijackers that hide from Public Route Collectors | KTH Royal Institute of Technology | 03/12/2022 10:37 p.m. | 184.164.236.0/23 |
| Proactive-prepending: High availability with good control | Northwestern University | 02/27/2023 2:17 p.m. | 184.164.252.0/23 |
| Latency Imbalance | LAAS-CNRS | 03/10/2023 10:56 p.m. | 2804:269c:4::/46 |
| Investigating the cause and impact of Hidden Hijack | Tsinghua University | 02/27/2023 3:26 p.m. | 138.185.230.0/23 |
| Measuring ROV protection | Cloudflare | 07/25/2023 6:40 p.m. | 2804:269c:8::/46 |
| Controlled Experiment on BGP Attacks to Expose PKI Weakness | Information Technology University | 12/11/2023 1:14 p.m. | 184.164.250.0/23 |
| BGP Attack on Weak PKI | Information Technology University | 01/17/2024 7:10 a.m. | 184.164.248.0/23 |
| Effectiveness of ITE techniques | FURG | 03/30/2024 10:25 a.m. | 184.164.226.0/23 |
| Experiment Name | University / Organization | Approved at |
|---|---|---|
| Study on prefix hijack attack on Tor | Princeton University | 03/24/2017 1:03 p.m. |
| Bitcoin Hijacking | ETH Zürich | 09/16/2016 5:14 a.m. |
| Identification of Inter-domain Poisoning Filters | Federal University of Minas Gerais | 05/24/2016 2:04 p.m. |
| M6 | AMS-IX | 05/12/2016 6:42 a.m. |
| Study on Routing Insecurity | Princeton University | 05/03/2016 11:10 p.m. |
| Jumpstarting Secure Interdomain Routing | Boston University | 12/04/2016 11:49 p.m. |
| Poisoning experiment | Telecom ParisTech / CAIDA | 03/24/2017 1:02 p.m. |
| PEERING Services | UFMG | 09/21/2016 7:43 p.m. |
| Feasibility of Shifting Onto Specific Paths via Poisoning | University of Tennessee, Knoxville | 04/17/2018 10:53 p.m. |
| Evaluating Traffic Engineering with BGP Manipulation | UFMG | 01/22/2017 10:38 p.m. |
| Dynamic Identification of Route Server Peers | University of Southern California | 03/11/2017 1:31 a.m. |
| Routing Attacks to Fake Certificates | Princeton University | 12/02/2016 5:08 a.m. |
| Routing Attacks to Fake Certificates | Princeton University | 04/18/2017 11:48 a.m. |
| Monitoring/Mitigating BGP Hijacking Attack | Universidade Federal do Estado do Rio de Janeiro - UNIRIO | 07/16/2018 11:51 p.m. |
| Data paths vs Control paths | University of Strasbourg | 09/04/2018 5:38 p.m. |
| Routing Attacks to get Fake Certificates | Princeton University | 01/05/2018 2:13 p.m. |
| BGP community filtering and propagation | NPS | 05/16/2018 6:02 p.m. |
| Traffic engineering on Anycast catchment | University of Maryland, College Park | 11/12/2017 8:24 p.m. |
| MRAI and route propagation measurements | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid | 08/30/2017 3:46 p.m. |
| Measurement of transitive attribute propagation | Technical University in Darmstadt | 03/26/2019 4:19 p.m. |
| BGP monitoring for ASes with transient connectivity | ETH Zurich | 05/23/2018 4:50 p.m. |
| BGP Hijacks | FORTH | 05/03/2016 11:11 p.m. |
| The impact of adaptive MRAI on the interdomain convergence | Federal University of Amazonas | 10/30/2017 2:24 p.m. |
| EAGER: Traffic Analysis Resistant Network | Clemson University | 11/06/2016 12:32 a.m. |
| Synchrophasor Traffic Re-routing and Mitigation | Clemson | 09/04/2017 8:56 p.m. |
| Topological Analysis on Routing and Server Selection | NIC Chile Research Labs | 12/11/2018 7:13 p.m. |
| IP Anycast Measurements | Foundation for Research and Technology - Hellas (FORTH) | 01/15/2019 1:51 p.m. |
| Route filtering measurement | Bar Ilan University | 03/26/2019 4:21 p.m. |
| Measuring Peer Lock Deployment | University of Tennessee, Knoxville | 07/11/2019 8:09 p.m. |
| Stealthy BGP Attacks | Princeton University | 11/06/2018 1:08 a.m. |
| Capacity Aware Traffic Shifting among Multiple Anycast Sites | University of Southern California | 08/20/2019 5:52 p.m. |
| BGP based traceback | CISPA − Helmholtz Center for Information Security | 08/05/2019 12:34 p.m. |
| Evaluation of Multiple-Path Domain Control Validation | Princeton University | 01/27/2020 4:39 p.m. |
| PathSets Evaluation | Princeton University | 08/09/2019 12:53 a.m. |
| Route Steering | University of Massachusetts, Amherst | 06/12/2018 9:40 p.m. |
| ROV deployment inference | Columbia University | 09/25/2019 5:36 p.m. |
| IP Anycast Verification Re-runs | Foundation for Research and Technology - Hellas (FORTH) | 11/09/2021 1:11 p.m. |
| Observation of Route Propagation Delay | Columbia University | 08/12/2017 6:59 p.m. |
| Default Route Measurements | University of Bundeswehr Munich | 10/30/2020 1 p.m. |
| Iterative Path Prepending | TU Berlin / INET | 07/16/2018 11:51 p.m. |
| More-specific prefix propagation | TU Berlin / INET | 03/14/2021 5:55 p.m. |
| Comparing AS paths in BGP routing table and the actual paths | National University of Singapore | 01/27/2020 4:29 p.m. |
| Testing BGP manipulations: AS poisoning and prefix hijacking | National University of Singapore | 04/11/2020 2:41 p.m. |
| BGP Community Handling Behavior | NPS | 05/15/2021 9:59 p.m. |
| Measuring BGP Hijack Affected Regions | KTH Royal Institute of Technology | 08/09/2021 9:20 p.m. |
| COS561 Project Loop Detection | Princeton University | 12/02/2021 8:34 p.m. |
| MAnycast 2 – Using Anycast to Measure Anycast | University of Twente | 09/05/2020 5:43 a.m. |
| RPKI Prefix Origin Validation | Freie Universität Berlin | 04/28/2016 5:39 p.m. |
| Predicting the Catchment of BGP Prefix Hijacking | Tsinghua University | 12/24/2021 5:39 p.m. |
| BGP monitoring and hijacks detection | University of Crete/ FORTH | 11/25/2022 7:44 p.m. |
| Regional Anycast v.s. Global Anycast | Duke University | 12/02/2021 10:08 p.m. |
| Dynamic detection of BGP hijacks | Edith Cowan University | 03/05/2022 2:19 p.m. |
| TMA Reverse Traceroute Tutorial | PEERING Testbed Staff | 06/21/2023 4:48 p.m. |
| Investigate propagation and filtering of BGP large community | Princeton University | 08/09/2021 9:11 p.m. |
| FABRIC PEERING demo | Princeton University | 09/01/2023 2:47 p.m. |