PEERING The BGP Testbed

Experiments

Running an Experiment

PEERING is an open testbed and welcomes experiments from researchers, educators, and network operators. To use the testbed, create an account and submit a proposal. In your proposal, please describe your experiment and its goals. In particular, describe:

The proposal review process allows PEERING staff to verify that experiments follow PEERING's Acceptable Use Policy and remain informed of ongoing experiments so that they can quickly respond to any operational problems or complaints. PEERING staff also provide feedback about experimental design, including possible problems and improvements.

After the approval of your proposal, you will receive certificates that will allow you to establish VPN tunnels to and BGP sessions with PEERING's servers. You can use any software for this, but the default PEERING client software may be a starting point. The project Wiki also contains additional details on PEERING that may be useful.



Approved Experiments

Approved Experiments
Experiment Name University / Organization Approved at Allocated prefixes
Locating DDoS Attackers UFMG 11/22/2016 11:26 p.m. —
SBAS Secure Backbone Prototype Princeton University 06/30/2020 2:10 p.m. 66.180.190.0/23
Measurements of Path Dynamics and Communities UFMS 01/17/2020 3:04 p.m. —
Validation of Traceroute-Inferred AS-Relationships CAIDA, UC San Diego 02/02/2021 2:06 p.m. —
Detection of BGP interception attacks based on RTT changes Princeton University 01/25/2021 8:03 p.m. 184.164.228.0/23
IPv6 Route Flooding TU Berlin / INET 09/25/2021 5:57 p.m. 2804:269c:10::/44
Hybrid anycast and DNS-based redirection reliability study Columbia University 10/07/2020 1:53 a.m. 184.164.244.0/23
Controlling Ingress Paths Columbia University 11/08/2021 5:50 p.m. 184.164.234.0/23, 184.164.238.0/23, 184.164.240.0/22
BGP security monitoring Google 08/31/2022 5:58 p.m. 199.36.157.0/24, 208.87.172.0/23, 2620:33:c000::/48
Proactive-prepending: High availability with good control Northwestern University 02/27/2023 2:17 p.m. 184.164.252.0/23
Latency Imbalance LAAS-CNRS 03/10/2023 10:56 p.m. 2804:269c:4::/46
Investigating the cause and impact of Hidden Hijack Tsinghua University 02/27/2023 3:26 p.m. —
Measuring RPKI ROV ecosystem Cloudflare 10/09/2024 7:32 p.m. 2602:f83d:80::/43, 2804:269c:3c::/46
Comparison between Bdrmapit and classic IP-to-AS strategies Federal University of São João del-Rei 05/07/2024 1:05 p.m. 184.164.231.0/24, 184.164.233.0/24
Auditing Action Communities CAIDA / UC San Diego 07/06/2024 10:08 p.m. 184.164.246.0/23
Effectiveness and security of ITE techniques FURG 08/15/2024 6:26 p.m. 184.164.226.0/23
PEERING Monitor Columbia University 07/07/2024 12:42 p.m. 184.164.236.0/24, 184.164.250.0/23, 2804:269c:8::/46
Measuring AS-Level Action Community Usage Tsinghua University 10/26/2024 2:19 p.m. 184.164.248.0/23
WHEREIS RIR geo-consistency validation NPS 11/15/2024 3:04 p.m. 184.164.237.0/24, 2804:269c:c::/46

Completed Experiments

Completed Experiments
Experiment Name University / Organization Approved at
Study on prefix hijack attack on Tor Princeton University 03/24/2017 1:03 p.m.
Bitcoin Hijacking ETH Zürich 09/16/2016 5:14 a.m.
Identification of Inter-domain Poisoning Filters Federal University of Minas Gerais 05/24/2016 2:04 p.m.
M6 AMS-IX 05/12/2016 6:42 a.m.
Study on Routing Insecurity Princeton University 05/03/2016 11:10 p.m.
Jumpstarting Secure Interdomain Routing Boston University 12/04/2016 11:49 p.m.
Poisoning experiment Telecom ParisTech / CAIDA 03/24/2017 1:02 p.m.
PEERING Services UFMG 09/21/2016 7:43 p.m.
Feasibility of Shifting Onto Specific Paths via Poisoning University of Tennessee, Knoxville 04/17/2018 10:53 p.m.
Evaluating Traffic Engineering with BGP Manipulation UFMG 01/22/2017 10:38 p.m.
Dynamic Identification of Route Server Peers University of Southern California 03/11/2017 1:31 a.m.
Routing Attacks to Fake Certificates Princeton University 12/02/2016 5:08 a.m.
Routing Attacks to Fake Certificates Princeton University 04/18/2017 11:48 a.m.
Monitoring/Mitigating BGP Hijacking Attack Universidade Federal do Estado do Rio de Janeiro - UNIRIO 07/16/2018 11:51 p.m.
Data paths vs Control paths University of Strasbourg 09/04/2018 5:38 p.m.
Routing Attacks to get Fake Certificates Princeton University 01/05/2018 2:13 p.m.
BGP community filtering and propagation NPS 05/16/2018 6:02 p.m.
Traffic engineering on Anycast catchment University of Maryland, College Park 11/12/2017 8:24 p.m.
MRAI and route propagation measurements Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 08/30/2017 3:46 p.m.
Measurement of transitive attribute propagation Technical University in Darmstadt 03/26/2019 4:19 p.m.
BGP monitoring for ASes with transient connectivity ETH Zurich 05/23/2018 4:50 p.m.
BGP Hijacks FORTH 05/03/2016 11:11 p.m.
The impact of adaptive MRAI on the interdomain convergence Federal University of Amazonas 10/30/2017 2:24 p.m.
EAGER: Traffic Analysis Resistant Network Clemson University 11/06/2016 12:32 a.m.
Synchrophasor Traffic Re-routing and Mitigation Clemson 09/04/2017 8:56 p.m.
Topological Analysis on Routing and Server Selection NIC Chile Research Labs 12/11/2018 7:13 p.m.
IP Anycast Measurements Foundation for Research and Technology - Hellas (FORTH) 01/15/2019 1:51 p.m.
Route filtering measurement Bar Ilan University 03/26/2019 4:21 p.m.
Measuring Peer Lock Deployment University of Tennessee, Knoxville 07/11/2019 8:09 p.m.
Stealthy BGP Attacks Princeton University 11/06/2018 1:08 a.m.
Capacity Aware Traffic Shifting among Multiple Anycast Sites University of Southern California 08/20/2019 5:52 p.m.
BGP based traceback CISPA − Helmholtz Center for Information Security 08/05/2019 12:34 p.m.
Evaluation of Multiple-Path Domain Control Validation Princeton University 01/27/2020 4:39 p.m.
PathSets Evaluation Princeton University 08/09/2019 12:53 a.m.
Route Steering University of Massachusetts, Amherst 06/12/2018 9:40 p.m.
ROV deployment inference Columbia University 09/25/2019 5:36 p.m.
IP Anycast Verification Re-runs Foundation for Research and Technology - Hellas (FORTH) 11/09/2021 1:11 p.m.
Observation of Route Propagation Delay Columbia University 08/12/2017 6:59 p.m.
Default Route Measurements University of Bundeswehr Munich 10/30/2020 1 p.m.
Iterative Path Prepending TU Berlin / INET 07/16/2018 11:51 p.m.
More-specific prefix propagation TU Berlin / INET 03/14/2021 5:55 p.m.
Comparing AS paths in BGP routing table and the actual paths National University of Singapore 01/27/2020 4:29 p.m.
Testing BGP manipulations: AS poisoning and prefix hijacking National University of Singapore 04/11/2020 2:41 p.m.
BGP Community Handling Behavior NPS 05/15/2021 9:59 p.m.
Measuring BGP Hijack Affected Regions KTH Royal Institute of Technology 08/09/2021 9:20 p.m.
COS561 Project Loop Detection Princeton University 12/02/2021 8:34 p.m.
MAnycast 2 – Using Anycast to Measure Anycast University of Twente 09/05/2020 5:43 a.m.
RPKI Prefix Origin Validation Freie Universität Berlin 04/28/2016 5:39 p.m.
Predicting the Catchment of BGP Prefix Hijacking Tsinghua University 12/24/2021 5:39 p.m.
Smart BGP hijackers that hide from Public Route Collectors KTH Royal Institute of Technology 03/12/2022 10:37 p.m.
BGP monitoring and hijacks detection University of Crete/ FORTH 11/25/2022 7:44 p.m.
Regional Anycast v.s. Global Anycast Duke University 12/02/2021 10:08 p.m.
Dynamic detection of BGP hijacks Edith Cowan University 03/05/2022 2:19 p.m.
TMA Reverse Traceroute Tutorial PEERING Testbed Staff 06/21/2023 4:48 p.m.
Investigate propagation and filtering of BGP large community Princeton University 08/09/2021 9:11 p.m.
Measuring ROV protection Cloudflare 07/25/2023 6:40 p.m.
FABRIC PEERING demo Princeton University 09/01/2023 2:47 p.m.
Controlled Experiment on BGP Attacks to Expose PKI Weakness Information Technology University 12/11/2023 1:14 p.m.
BGP Attack on Weak PKI Information Technology University 01/17/2024 7:10 a.m.